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Abstract: Historians of Britain’s post-war welfare state have long been aware of the 
shortcomings of the social insurance model, but the political impact of the Beveridge report 
has tended to obscure the alternative visions of welfare canvassed in the 1940s and 1950s. 
This article examines the social activist Juliet Rhys-Williams’ campaign for the integration of 
the tax and benefit systems and the provision of a universal basic income, which attracted 
wide interest from economists, journalists, and Liberal and Conservative politicians during 
and after the Second World War. Though Rhys-Williams’ proposals were not adopted, they 
helped establish a distinctive ‘social market’ perspective on welfare provision which has 
become central to British social policy debates since the 1960s and 1970s. 
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Beveridge’s rival: Juliet Rhys-Williams and the campaign for basic income, 1942-55 
Historians of the development of Britain’s post-war welfare state have long been aware that 
they are dealing with a paradox. On one hand, it is clear that the cluster of reforms which 
made up the 1940s welfare settlement – social security, family allowances, the National 
Health Service, and the commitment to maintain a high and stable level of employment – 
embodied a solidaristic and universalist ethos which contrasted sharply with older liberal 
notions of voluntary action and individual responsibility.
1
 Yet though its achievements have 
been considerable, the welfare state has consistently struggled to live up to its rhetoric of 
inclusive social citizenship. As many scholars have pointed out, the Beveridgean social 
insurance model at the heart of the post-war settlement is profoundly gendered, being 
strongly oriented towards the needs of capitalist employment in general and the male 
breadwinner in particular.
2
 Partly for this reason, post-war governments have never wholly 
succeeded in eliminating poverty except on the most restrictive definition. 
The story of the Beveridge report is a familiar one, first told in detail by José Harris 
and Paul Addison almost forty years ago, and the reasons for its adoption as the basis of post-
war social policy are clear enough.
3
 Radical in scope yet evolutionary in character, published 
with all the authority of an official document, and invested with symbolic value by press and 
politicians, the report quickly came to dominate wartime reconstruction debates. Yet one of 
the consequences of Beveridge’s success was to cast into the shadows the alternative visions 
of welfare which were canvassed by contemporaries. Despite a vast empirical and theoretical 
literature on the British welfare state, we know remarkably little about the roads not taken. 
This article seeks to illuminate British social policy debates during the 1940s and 
1950s by examining one of the most important alternatives to the Beveridge model, namely 
the campaign for tax-benefit integration and the provision of a universal basic income led by 
the socialite and political activist Lady Juliet Rhys-Williams.
4
 Rhys-Williams’ campaign 
deserves attention for three main reasons. Firstly, her scheme represented a radical response 
to the problems of poverty and idleness confronted by Beveridge, which drew on similar 
concepts – universality, contribution, less eligibility, and the national minimum – but 
configured them in a less gendered and labour-oriented way. Egalitarian and feminist 
political philosophers such as Philippe van Parijs, Erik Olin Wright, Ailsa McKay, and 
Almaz Zelleke have been attracted to the idea of an unconditional basic income for precisely 
this reason: by reducing the importance of paid employment, it makes possible a wider range 
of life choices and so underpins ‘real freedom for all’.5 Other scholars, such as Tony 
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4
 I use the term ‘basic income’ throughout this article in the interests of convenience and 
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Atkinson and Stuart White, have suggested that the basic income should be made conditional 
on some form of contribution to society in order to prevent free-riding.
6
 
Secondly, the reception of Rhys-Williams’ ideas casts important light on wartime and 
post-war attitudes to work, welfare, and family structure. On the one hand, it is striking how 
many academics, journalists, and politicians were prepared to contemplate the idea of a basic 
income; on the other hand, the most important policy-makers remained decidedly hostile. 
Rhys-Williams framed her scheme as a tax reform and played down its gender implications, 
but still aroused criticism from those who believed it would subsidize idleness and weaken 
work incentives. Its failure reminds us both how difficult it was for individual policy 
entrepreneurs to penetrate the institutions of the British state, and how widely Beveridge’s 
liberal and male-breadwinner assumptions were shared in Westminster, Whitehall, and 
British industry. 
Thirdly, notwithstanding its failure, Rhys-Williams’ campaign helped lay the 
foundations for a distinctive ‘social market’ approach to the relief of poverty through direct 
income transfers, which has become increasingly central to British social policy debate since 
the 1960s and 1970s.
7
 Not only did Rhys-Williams force Treasury officials to examine the 
practicability of a basic income, but she also developed a following among liberal economists 
such as James Meade and Alan Peacock, who saw transfer payments as a market-oriented 
alternative to collective provision and benefits in kind. The episode thus forms an important 
prologue to contemporary debates about equality and redistribution and the role of income 
support policies such as Universal Credit. 
   
Juliet Rhys-Williams and the ‘new social contract’  
 
Juliet Rhys-Williams was born in 1898 as Juliette Glyn, younger daughter of the romantic 
novelist Elinor Glyn and her barrister husband Clayton. From the age of nineteen she worked 
as a private secretary in Whitehall, and at twenty-two she married Sir Rhys Williams, a South 
Wales lawyer, coalowner, and Coalition Liberal MP, with whom she had four children.
8
 
During the 1930s, Rhys-Williams became a leading figure in the maternity and child welfare 
movement as honorary secretary of the National Birthday Trust and the Joint Council of 
Midwifery, where she helped pave the way for the Midwives Act 1936. The National 
Birthday Trust was a notably elite organisation, founded by Lady George Cholmondeley to 
raise funds for voluntary maternity hospitals, but Rhys-Williams persuaded her colleagues to 
adopt a broader focus on the problems of maternal mortality and malnutrition.
9
 In 1934 she 
launched an experimental scheme for distributing food supplements to poor expectant 
mothers in the Rhondda, which was subsequently extended to other depressed districts in 
South Wales and County Durham with support from the Special Areas Commission.
10
 Rhys-
Williams also served alongside her husband on the Bishop of Llandaff’s Committee, which 
investigated the South Wales unemployment problem, and was an active member of Harold 
Macmillan’s Next Five Years Group.11 Concern about malnutrition and work incentives 
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pushed her towards a universalist view of welfare, and when she fought the safe Labour seat 
of Pontypridd as a Liberal National candidate in a February 1938 by-election she emphasized 
her support for family allowances, cheap milk, and better old age pensions.
12
 Later that year 
the Munich agreement shattered her faith in the National Government, and she defected to the 
opposition Liberals.
13
  
Rhys-Williams was an unlikely Liberal in a number of respects: not only was her 
political background Conservative, but she was a fervent imperialist and a supporter of tariff 
protection at a time when the Liberal Party was still strongly committed to free trade.
14
 As 
she explained to her friend Leo Amery during the Second World War,   
   
My Liberalism is purely on social policy. I think their free-trade ideas are just as 
absurdly old-fashioned as you do, + their little Englandism (now fairly extinct) 
quite revolting! It was Conservative complacency over distressed areas which 
drove me out. Also ‘appeasement’.15 
  
Despite this ideological ambivalence, Rhys-Williams rapidly became a leading figure within 
the depleted Liberal ranks: honorary secretary of the Women’s Liberal Federation (1943-5), 
chairman of the party’s Publications and Publicity Committee (1944-6), prospective 
candidate for Ilford North, and a member of the party’s ruling Council.16 It was here that she 
developed her basic income proposals.  
The idea of a basic income for all citizens was hardly a new one, as the Belgian 
scholar Walter van Trier has shown.
17
 Thomas Paine suggested a system of universal grants 
in his 1797 pamphlet on Agrarian Justice, and the American utopian writer Edward Bellamy 
popularized the idea in his influential 1888 novel Looking Backward.
18
 The concept achieved 
wider currency on the British left at the end of the First World War, when Bertrand Russell 
endorsed it in Roads to Freedom and a group of Quakers led by Mabel and Dennis Milner 
developed plans for a ‘state bonus’.19 C. H. Douglas’ social credit scheme included provision 
for a universal ‘national dividend’, and socialist economists such as Abba Lerner, James 
Meade, and G. D. H. Cole also floated the possibility of introducing a ‘social dividend’ 
during the 1930s, either as a counter-cyclical device, an egalitarian measure, or a means of 
distributing the profits of nationalized industries.
20
 Rhys-Williams may have encountered one 
or more of these proposals. Yet the political climate of inter-war Britain was hardly congenial 
to the adoption of radical distributive measures, and the idea was liable to be discredited by 
association with the heterodox economics of the Douglas credit scheme. Liberals and 
Conservatives showed little interest, and the Labour leadership preferred to pursue a more 
conventional path to socialism. 
                                                          
12
 Manchester Guardian, 25 Jan. 1938, 5; see also Lewis, The Politics of Motherhood, 188. 
13
 British Library of Political and Economic Science, Rhys-Williams papers, J 10/2, Juliet 
Rhys-Williams to Stanley Evans, 14 Nov. 1938 (copy). 
14
 Rhys-Williams papers, J 11/2, Juliet Rhys-Williams to Percy Cohen, 10 Jan. 1937 (copy). 
15
 Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, Amery papers, AMEL 2/2/29, Juliet Rhys-
Williams to Leo Amery, 27 May 1943. 
16
 Nicoll, ‘Williams, Dame Juliet Evangeline Rhys’. For a fuller analysis of the Liberal 
Party’s internal politics during the war, see Sloman, Liberal Party, pp. 135-65. 
17
 van Trier, Every One A King. 
18
 Paine, Agrarian Justice; Bellamy, Looking Backward. 
19
 Russell, Roads to Freedom, 99-120; Milner and Milner, State Bonus; van Trier, Every One 
A King, 31-142. 
20
 Ibid., 143-407. 
5 
 
The Second World War provided a more propitious environment for basic income 
advocates as a result of two developments. The first was that the needs of wartime 
mobilization prompted the British state to accept much wider responsibility for its citizens’ 
welfare, reflected in the introduction of rationing and food subsidies and also of separation 
allowances for the families of service personnel. Eleanor Rathbone’s campaign for family 
allowances had gained momentum during the late 1930s as Conservatives and Liberals 
embraced it as an anti-poverty measure, and the trade union movement – which had long 
feared that family allowances would depress wage rates – began to relax its hostility 
following the outbreak of war.
21
 From 1941 the question of family allowances became linked 
with the work of the Interdepartmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services, 
chaired by Sir William Beveridge, which examined the possibility of expanding and unifying 
existing social insurance schemes and took evidence from a range of interested parties. 
Beveridge favoured the development of a comprehensive insurance scheme for 
unemployment, sickness, and old age pensions alongside non-contributory family allowances, 
but there was clearly scope for further simplification. Both Political and Economic Planning 
and the Fabian Society urged Beveridge to abandon flat-rate insurance contributions and 
throw the whole cost of social security on to the Exchequer.
22
 
The prospects for basic income were also enhanced by the government’s decision to 
widen the income tax net in order to curtail private consumption and finance the war effort. 
As a result of rising wages and reduced thresholds and allowances, the number of income-tax 
payers grew from 3,700,000 in 1937/8 to 6,000,000 in 1940/1 and 13,000,000 in 1944/5 and 
came to include a large section of the working class.
23
 Yet the existing system of lump-sum 
collection in arrears was strikingly ill-suited to working-class budgeting habits, and through a 
system of deductions from wages was quickly introduced the government faced strong 
pressure from MPs and trade unionists for these to be based on current earnings.
24
 The Inland 
Revenue eventually met this demand by devising cumulative Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE) in 
1943, but in the interim there was a ready market for schemes which would allow income tax 
to be deducted on a current basis. One obvious solution, as The Economist pointed out, was to 
deduct tax at a flat rate from all wages and then to pay personal and family allowances in 
cash as a separate operation.
25
 The paper seems to have been thinking of vouchers which 
taxpayers could encash on production of a certificate of tax paid, but from here it was only a 
relatively small step to a basic income. 
Juliet Rhys-Williams began working on tax-benefit reform in the summer of 1941, out 
of frustration at the way in which means-tested unemployment assistance had operated during 
the 1930s.
26
 She pointed out that the Unemployment Assistance Board simultaneously 
provided an inadequate income for unemployment workers, prevented them from taking part-
time and casual jobs, and discouraged those with large families from returning to work 
because they would lose their dependents’ allowances. The solution, she thought, was to 
abandon the ‘strange convention’ that the state should only provide material aid to the 
unemployed and elderly, and ‘substitute for it the democratic principle that the State owes 
precisely the same advantages to every citizen, and should consequently pay the same 
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benefits to the employed and healthy as to the idle and sick’.27 Rhys-Williams proposed that 
citizens should pay income tax at a flat rate of 9/- in the £ (45 per cent) on all earnings up to 
the surtax threshold, and in return would receive a weekly cash payment to cover basic 
subsistence needs, which she estimated at 21/- for a man, 19/- for a woman and 10/- for a 
child, with regional variation for rent.
28
 At one stroke the scheme would solve a host of 
intractable problems. Tax could be deducted on a current basis, the means test and the 
poverty trap would disappear, the financial relationship between the citizen and the state 
would be greatly simplified, and much of the bureaucracy of social insurance could be 
abolished. Mothers and housewives would receive an independent income, low-paid 
occupations such as agriculture would become more viable, and the highest earners would 
also gain as the top rates of income tax and surtax were reduced. Last but not least, the 
Treasury would obtain a powerful fiscal regulator.
29
  
Rhys-Williams believed that her scheme would improve work incentives because 
benefits would not be withdrawn with increased earnings, but she recognized the risk that 
some citizens might choose to live on their allowances, placing a heavy tax burden on those 
who worked. Consequently, though she did not object to a universal payment on principle, 
she proposed to make the allowances conditional on labour market participation for men and 
single women.
30
 Each adult citizen would sign a contract with the state, promising to work to 
the best of their ability – full-time for men, part-time for single women and young widows 
without dependent children – in return for subsistence. Those who chose not to sign or fulfil 
the social contract would not be eligible for benefits.
31
 Rhys-Williams thus made explicit the 
reciprocity principle which was implicit in the social insurance system and, as Ben Jackson 
has shown, pervaded even egalitarian social thought in this period.
32
 
 
Beveridge’s rival, 1942-5 
 
Juliet Rhys-Williams first outlined her ideas in a privately-printed pamphlet in August 1942, 
which she circulated to friends including the Conservative ministers Sir Kingsley Wood and 
Leo Amery, and was commissioned to develop them into a book under the title of Something 
to Look Forward To.
33
 By the time the book appeared in May 1943, however, the political 
landscape had been transformed by the rapturous public reception of the Beveridge report and 
demands from Labour and Liberal backbenchers for the adoption of ‘Beveridge in full’. In 
these circumstances, pressing for the adoption of an alternative form of social security was 
bound to be an uphill struggle. Nevertheless, Beveridge was not without his critics even in 
progressive circles: for instance, Political and Economic Planning argued that flat-rate 
contributions were regressive and inelastic, whilst Seebohm Rowntree pointed out that the 
scheme would not eliminate poverty among the low-paid and self-employed.
34
 The most 
impassioned critique came from Elizabeth Abbot and Katherine Bompas  of the Women’s 
Freedom League, who accused Beveridge of producing ‘a man’s plan for man’, 
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differentiating between married and unmarried women and denying women workers an equal 
status.
35
 Rhys-Williams argued that her approach would make good these deficiencies.
36
  
One promising constituency for Rhys-Williams’ ideas lay in the women’s movement, 
where Eleanor Rathbone and the Family Endowment Society had long advocated ‘wages for 
housewives’. Rhys-Williams’ conception of womanhood was maternalist rather than 
egalitarian, as her willingness to excuse married women from work requirements showed, but 
her scheme nevertheless represented a significant advance over Beveridge’s strong male-
breadwinner assumptions. The South Wales Women’s Parliament passed a resolution in 
January 1943 which embodied her criticisms of Beveridge, and in December the Women’s 
Liberal Federation (WLF) endorsed a modified version of the proposals, which it proceeded 
to press on the Liberal Party itself.
37
 Eleanor Rathbone was also favourably impressed, and 
urged ministers to give the scheme serious consideration.
38
 Yet though Rhys-Williams met 
with representatives from several women’s groups in March 1944, none of the main feminist 
organizations took her ideas up.
39
 The egalitarian feminists of the Six Point Group had a well-
established agenda of their own, centred on equal pay and the marriage bar, whilst the Family 
Endowment Society was focussed on ensuring that family allowances were paid to the 
mother. In any case the government’s acceptance of the social insurance model seemed to be 
a fait accompli, so it made more sense to press for limited changes to the Beveridge scheme 
which would make it more gender neutral.
40
 
Outside feminist circles, it was the possibility of simplifying the relationship between 
the individual and the state that attracted most attention. Here Rhys-Williams’ scheme tended 
to be coupled with a similar proposal by a pair of London actuaries, A. T. Haynes and R. J. 
Kirton, which was also published in May 1943.
41
 The Economist gave the two schemes 
sympathetic coverage and suggested that they provided a logical blueprint towards which tax 
and social security might develop in the long term; so too did W. Manning Dacey in The 
Observer, J. C. Johnstone in the Daily Telegraph, and The Times’ City editor.42 The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Kingsley Wood, commissioned a Treasury analysis of the 
proposals, and the Liberal Party set up a special committee under the chairmanship of Sir 
Walter Layton, which reported that the version adopted by the WLF was ‘sound in 
principle’.43 The social security expert Sir Ronald Davison congratulated Rhys-Williams on 
‘a brilliant piece of sustained thought’, whilst the Liberal matriarch Violet Bonham Carter 
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showed the scheme to John Maynard Keynes, who said that he found the idea ‘very 
attractive’ and had tried to work out more than one variant of it himself.44 
Keynes pointed out, however, that support for the principle of tax-benefit integration 
was very different to accepting the details of particular proposals, and the expert scrutiny 
which Rhys-Williams had sought brought her scheme’s drawbacks into focus. Critical 
attention centred on the cost of paying subsistence-level allowances to every citizen. E. F. 
Schumacher, who examined the scheme for the Liberals, estimated that taxation would have 
to rise to 53 per cent of national income to finance the payments, even if the government 
managed to pare back its expenditure on roads, defence, and agriculture.
45
 The editor of The 
Economist, Geoffrey Crowther, was more sympathetic to the principle, but agreed that Rhys-
Williams was ‘going far too fast in extending the scope of social security and using up a great 
deal of taxable capacity without enquiring whether the objects on which the money is to be 
spent are really those which should have priority’.46 Within government, the veteran Treasury 
official Herbert Brittain made the same point. Although the finances of the scheme were 
plausible enough, 
 
from a general point of view it is highly fantastic that when the total gross 
payments required, according to Beveridge, to relieve want, sickness, etc. 
amount to about £700 millions, we should go to the length of paying out £2,280 
millions and of having to collect £2,000 millions more in income tax than at 
present.
47
 
 
At a time when ministers and civil servants were concerned by the cost of Beveridge’s 
proposals, there seemed to be little point in pressing for a more expensive scheme. As the 
taxation expert László Rostas observed, the Beveridge report had ‘a better chance of general 
acceptance’, and if augmented by adequate family allowances and minimum wages it ‘would 
probably serve the same big aims’.48  
The impact of a basic income on work incentives was also felt to be less clear-cut than 
Rhys-Williams had claimed. It was probably true that it would make it easier for the 
unemployed to return to work, and it was also possible that marginal tax rates could be 
reduced at the top end, but Schumacher pointed out that a flat-rate deduction would mean 
higher marginal rates for millions of workers whose incomes currently fell below the 
threshold or only took them into the reduced-rate bands. ‘Taxation’, he argued, ‘inevitably 
weakens the pecuniary incentive to work, and this effect is more pronounced in the case of 
small incomes than of large ones.’49 Edward Hale of the Treasury also thought that the social 
contract would be difficult to enforce, especially in the case of the self-employed.
50
 It may 
have been for this reason that Rhys-Williams abandoned the formal contract in later versions 
of her scheme and suggested that workers might continue to receive a conventional tax 
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allowance instead of a subsistence payment.
51
 However, this modification threatened to 
destroy the scheme’s administrative and conceptual simplicity. 
The strongest defence of the status quo came from the Board of Inland Revenue, 
whose chairman Sir Cornelius Gregg dismissed Something to Look Forward To as ‘special 
pleading of a soppy sentimental character with no real principle behind it’.52 The Revenue 
argued that the equation of income tax allowances with social benefits gave ‘an entirely false 
picture’ because the two systems embodied different principles: income tax was based on the 
concept of taxable capacity, which varied according to family responsibilities as well as 
income, whereas social security was designed to prevent citizens from suffering material 
want as a result of unemployment, sickness, or old age.
53
 Gregg also articulated the 
Revenue’s traditional concern for the legitimacy of tax collection, insisting that it would be 
wrong ‘to entangle the Income Tax machine in the payment of Social Service benefits’ and 
difficult to collect a flat rate of tax from all incomes.
54
 Sir Bernard Gilbert of the Treasury 
added the political point that a scheme which demolished the argument for a family wage was 
unlikely to be popular with the trade unions.
55
 
Official attitudes towards Rhys-Williams’ scheme may have been coloured by sexism 
and hostility to lay initiative; Eleanor Rathbone certainly suspected as much.
56
 Even so, the 
Treasury and Inland Revenue’s criticisms were cogent enough in their own terms, and were 
accepted as such by Sir Kingsley Wood and his successor Sir John Anderson.
57
 Contributory 
social insurance, progressive income tax, and cumulative PAYE thus became the main fiscal 
pillars of the welfare state, supported for different reasons by both Labour and the 
Conservatives. Even the Liberals’ enthusiasm for radical reform waned after Beveridge 
joined their ranks as MP for Berwick-upon-Tweed in October 1944, since the party could 
hardly alienate its star recruit. The January 1945 Liberal Assembly passed a resolution which 
noted the need for tax-benefit integration, but Beveridge took little interest in the idea, and it 
made no appearance in the party’s 1945 election campaign.58  
 
‘A progressive policy for the right’, 1945-51  
 
The adoption of the insurance model as the basis for post-war social policy was sealed by the 
landslide Labour victory in the 1945 general election. Though Let Us Face the Future did not 
mention the Beveridge report by name, 97 Labour MPs had voted for its early 
implementation in the famous February 1943 Commons debate, and the party seems to have 
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profited from popular enthusiasm for it.
59
 Jim Griffiths, who had led the 1943 rebellion, 
became Minister of National Insurance and piloted a modified version of Beveridge’s plan 
into law as the 1946 National Insurance Act.
60
 Griffiths and his colleagues took justifiable 
pride in implementing wartime reconstruction plans and overcoming the economic 
difficulties which threatened to destabilize them. At the same time, Hugh Dalton and Sir 
Stafford Cripps responded to demands for income tax reductions by increasing personal 
allowances, earned income relief, and the reduced-rate bands: Dalton’s first budget, for 
instance, took about 2,000,000 people – mostly working men – out of income tax 
altogether.
61
 All this suggested that Rhys-Williams’ ideas were politically dead – as an LSE 
economist, H. S. Booker, lamented in the Economic Journal.
62
 
By the middle of the 1945 Parliament, however, tax-benefit reform had returned to the 
political agenda for two reasons. The first was the growth of concern across the political 
spectrum – including the Trades Union Congress, the Federation of British Industry, and 
Conservative and Labour MPs – about the impact of taxation on work incentives.63 As 
Richard Whiting and Martin Daunton have shown, this was a central topic of political debate 
during the Attlee years.
64
 Quite apart from the overall tax burden, the structure of PAYE 
made workers more aware of the marginal rate which they paid on additional earnings and 
also provided for refunds if wages fell towards the end of the tax year, allegedly encouraging 
absenteeism, discouraging overtime, and undermining the Attlee government’s production 
drive. The Conservative MP David Eccles and the former Inland Revenue official Paul 
Chambers, who had devised PAYE before becoming a director of ICI, both argued that a flat-
rate tax on low and middle incomes would solve these problems. Eccles proposed to pay tax 
allowances through a voucher system, but Chambers pointed out that the standard rate could 
be reduced to just 3/- in the £ (15 per cent) on incomes up to £500 if all allowances were 
abolished.
65
 In either case, the social security system would have to be retained in some form. 
Concerns about incentives were reinforced among mainstream economists by 
frustration with the Attlee government’s policy of maintaining wartime food and housing 
subsidies. Market-oriented Keynesians such as James Meade, Roy Harrod, and Alan Peacock 
argued that these subsidies offended against both economic efficiency and consumer choice: 
it would be better to supplement the incomes of the poorest citizens and allow them to spend 
the money as they chose.
66
 Meade viewed tax-benefit integration as a powerful tool for 
redistributing purchasing power, and included a detailed discussion of the Rhys-Williams 
scheme in his 1948 book Planning and the Price Mechanism; he also canvassed the idea 
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within the Labour Party.
67
 Harrod likewise thought that the idea of a basic income was 
‘radically sound’ and ‘might constitute a genuine rival to that of socialism itself’.68 
Juliet Rhys-Williams was well placed to take advantage of this renewed interest in her 
scheme. After the 1945 election she had become a central figure in the Design for Freedom 
movement, which sought to bring about Liberal-Conservative cooperation; she was also 
honorary secretary of Winston Churchill’s United Europe Movement and a small London-
based think-tank, the Economic Research Council.
69
 During 1948 she met with Paul 
Chambers and James Meade with a view to devising a mutually acceptable scheme, but the 
ideological differences between them proved too great.
70
 Chambers was preoccupied by the 
need to reduce tax rates and horrified by the idea of subsistence-level cash allowances, 
whereas Meade pointed out that it was only the possibility of replacing the National 
Insurance system with a basic income that created scope for large administrative savings.
71
 
The political reception of these ideas reflected the complex nexus of gender, class, 
and ideology which lay at the heart of post-war debates about austerity and consumption, as 
Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska has shown.
72
 The Attlee government showed little interest, since 
the concept of basic incomes cut across both elements in Labour’s traditional egalitarian 
strategy – higher wages for working men and collective provision of necessities such as 
health, education, and housing. As Amy Black and Stephen Brooke have pointed out, the 
Labour Party’s trade unionist roots meant that its economic policies ‘stressed producers rather 
than consumers’, whilst ‘the assumption that the party of welfare was the party of women’ 
fostered a degree of ‘complacency’ towards female voters.73 Meade’s enthusiasm for market 
pricing and consumer choice was a minority taste within the party, and his efforts to canvass 
support for Rhys-Williams’ scheme made little headway – though the sociologist Barbara 
Wootton, the young economist Brian Abel-Smith, and the future Cabinet minister Douglas 
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Houghton all recognized its radical potential.
74
 At the Treasury, both Stafford Cripps and 
Hugh Gaitskell investigated the possibility of income tax simplification, but the schemes 
prepared by Inland Revenue officials provided for a series of low flat rates and left National 
Insurance untouched.
75
 In the end, nothing was done in this direction before Labour lost 
office in 1951. One reason was that Dalton’s policy of removing low earners from tax was 
politically difficult to reverse; another was the TUC’s vocal commitment to a single, steeply 
progressive income tax system.
76
 
Rhys-Williams’ ideas achieved greater traction in the Liberal Party, which was less 
sensitive to trade union opinion and more concerned about choice and incentives. Although 
the Liberals welcomed the Attlee government’s flagship social legislation, the National 
Insurance Act and the creation of the National Health Service, some activists worried that the 
continued expansion of collective provision would undermine independence and personal 
responsibility.
77
 As the leading Yorkshire Liberal (and former party president) Elliott Dodds 
asked in 1949: 
 
Is it right that the State should appropriate so large a proportion of citizens’ 
incomes and spend it on their behalf, instead of leaving them to spend it 
according to their own free choices?
78
   
 
Like Meade and the liberal economists, Dodds and his colleagues were most suspicious of 
food and housing subsidies, but they recognized that outright opposition to these measures 
was likely to be seen as an assault on working-class interests. Rhys-Williams’ scheme offered 
a means of squaring the circle by compensating poorer workers and their families for the loss 
of benefits in kind.
79
 Philip Fothergill, the chairman of the party’s national executive, also 
hoped that such radical proposals would help attract voters’ attention during the forthcoming 
election campaign.
80
 The 1949 Liberal Assembly thus reaffirmed the principle of tax-benefit 
integration, and a Taxation Committee chaired by the London accountant Guy Naylor was 
tasked with working out the details.
81
 Naylor and his colleagues concluded that a subsistence-
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level scheme would damage work incentives, and instead proposed to pay a cash allowance 
of 12/6 – about half the basic National Assistance rate, excluding rent, for a single person – to 
all adults and children. This would be financed by a flat-rate tax of 5/- (25 per cent) on earned 
incomes up to £600 and the abolition of the food subsidies.
82
 Though the committee’s report 
appeared too late for the party to use in the February 1950 election, it was endorsed by the 
party Council in June 1950, and Rhys-Williams thought it ‘quite excellent as an interim step’ 
on the way to a basic income.
83
  
By the late 1940s, however, Rhys-Williams had drifted away from the Liberal Party 
in frustration at its ambivalence towards the government. In any case, the Liberals were in 
precipitate decline, and struggled to find an electoral niche for themselves under Clement 
Davies’ leadership; by 1951 the party had just six seats and was ‘on the brink of oblivion’.84 
The real prize Rhys-Williams sought was the Conservative Party’s backing, and she 
energetically used her position as Churchill’s intermediary with the Liberals to press the 
merits of reform. ‘There is a progressive policy for the right, as well as for the left,’ she wrote 
to the Tory leader in January 1949, ‘and this is the time for it.’85 Rhys-Williams argued that 
her scheme would burnish the Conservatives’ appeal to agricultural workers and women 
voters – two key electoral groups – whilst providing political cover for cuts in the food 
subsidies and reducing taxes on the highest incomes.
86
 Framed in these terms, the concept of 
tax-benefit reform was an appealing one which both chimed with the party’s rhetoric of 
‘setting the people free’ and offered a means of outflanking Labour on welfare policy. A 
number of leading Conservatives – notably Harold Macmillan and Duncan Sandys – took a 
close interest in Rhys-Williams’ proposals, and R. A. Butler commissioned a detailed 
analysis from David Dear and Reginald Maudling of the Conservative Research 
Department.
87
  
Over time, though, the Conservatives decided against Rhys-Williams’ scheme for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the idea of a basic income ran up against the party’s deep-seated 
suspicion of redistributive taxation and welfare spending, which was accentuated by the 
middle-class reaction against the Attlee government. As Harriet Jones and E. H. H. Green 
have shown, the early 1950s saw the emergence of a ‘selectivist’ critique of the welfare state 
within the party, in pamphlets such as Enoch Powell and Iain Macleod’s The Social Services: 
Needs and Means (1952).
88
 If liberal economists were attracted to a basic income as a means 
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of enlarging consumer choice, Conservatives were alarmed by the prospect of making every 
citizen ‘dependent on and in some degree a pensioner of the State’: Sir John Anderson, for 
instance, saw this as ‘a concession to the pestilent Socialist doctrine of re-distribution and a 
long step on the way to Communism’.89 Secondly, Churchill was determined not to tie the 
hands of a future Conservative government by making expensive tax and spending 
commitments. As a former occupant of the Treasury himself, he insisted that taxation was ‘a 
matter which should be studied by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and not a subject for an 
election campaign’.90 Thirdly, Dear and Maudling were unconvinced by the political benefits 
of the scheme, since it would not only increase the overall level of taxation but also tend to 
redistribute income away from middle earners towards the rich and the poor.
91
 In electoral 
terms, it made much better sense for the Conservatives to cut income tax for skilled workers 
and other middle-income groups, restoring the ‘dip’ in the incidence of taxation which had 
existed in the 1920s and 1930s.
92
 As for women voters, the party was already making 
substantial gains as a result of its promise to abolish rationing.
93
  
The Conservative leadership’s rejection of the Rhys-Williams scheme thus reflected a 
growing confidence in the party’s electoral position. The results of the 1950 general election 
– which reduced Labour to a majority of five – confirmed Churchill’s belief that there was no 
need to enter into a bidding war over social policy, and thereafter he put his faith in ‘housing, 
red meat, and not getting scuppered’.94 Outside the narrow but important field of house-
building, where the temptation to exploit Aneurin Bevan’s perceived failure was irresistible, 
the party focussed on reassuring voters about its intentions towards the welfare state whilst 
emphasizing the need to control its cost.
95
 As a result, the social policy of Churchill’s 1951-5 
government had (in Timothy Raison’s words) ‘a curiously uncomplicated flavour’.96 Butler 
used his 1952 budget to cut the food subsidies and grant compensatory increases in family 
allowances and National Insurance benefits; he also increased earned income relief and 
extended the reduced-rate bands, and followed this up with standard-rate cuts in 1953 and 
1955.
97
 On the social security side, the contributory principle was reaffirmed, partly because 
it was believed to encourage personal responsibility and partly because it offered a powerful 
lever for reining in spending.
98
 Butler’s strategy may have amounted to little more than fiscal 
‘tinkering’, but the increased Conservative majorities in 1955 and 1959 suggest that it was 
politically astute.
99
 As Whiting has pointed out, the income tax cuts effectively drove a 
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wedge between the interests of better-paid skilled workers and other working-class groups.
100
 
As marginal rates fell and insurance benefits grew, the scope for a radical overhaul of tax and 
benefits contracted further. 
    
The Royal Commission on Taxation and the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ 
  
The appointment of a Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income in 1951 
presented a final opportunity for Rhys-Williams to make the case for reform. Although it was 
established by the Attlee government in response to criticism of its differential profits tax, the 
Commission also considered personal taxation, and specifically invited evidence on ‘whether 
it would be advantageous to link income tax with social security payments and 
contributions’.101 Rhys-Williams, Haynes and Kirton, and the Liberal Party submitted 
detailed memoranda and were examined at oral hearings in June and July 1951.  
The Royal Commission, however, turned out to be no more receptive to Rhys-
Williams’ ideas than Labour and Conservative ministers had been. The two leading 
economists on the Commission, Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks, were keen to advance their 
own ideas – Kaldor for a progressive expenditure tax, Hicks for a simple wages tax on the 
lines suggested by Chambers – whilst most of its other members seem to have been 
predisposed to support the status quo.
102
 This conservatism was encouraged by the Inland 
Revenue, whose opposition to reform was as strong as ever. The Board’s trenchant 
memorandum on the Liberal proposals pointed out that the trade-off between incentive and 
simplification was inescapable – it was possible to reduce tax rates or do away with the social 
insurance system, but not both – and argued that there was little intrinsic merit in a half-way 
house. It also used its statistical expertise and contacts within Whitehall to cast doubt on the 
reformers’ estimates of cost and administrative savings: for instance, it claimed that the 
Liberals had set their tax rate almost 1/- too low and that any savings from the abolition of 
PAYE would be offset by the additional burden on the Post Office.
103
 Arthur Cockfield, the 
Board’s Director of Statistics and Intelligence, later amplified these points in person.104 
The Inland Revenue memorandum may have been a ‘hatchet job’, but its hostility to 
change was shared by most of the outside organisations which submitted evidence.
105
 Though 
the TUC had previously expressed concerns about the operation of PAYE, it now played 
down its disincentive effect and rejected the idea of a simple wages tax. The TUC 
memorandum also criticized the notion of a basic income paid ‘irrespective of need’ and 
argued that the insurance principle was important because it established a right to benefit.
106
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From the other side of industry, the British Employers’ Confederation argued that the various 
integration schemes would be ‘detrimental to productive effort and industrial relations and 
would unnecessarily increase the existing pressing burden of taxation’, and the Federation of 
British Industries echoed this line, though some of its members favoured a flat tax.
107
 The 
economist Ralph Hawtrey spelled out what these groups left implicit, namely a fear of 
subsidizing the undeserving poor. ‘A disadvantage of the cash allowance’, Hawtrey argued, 
   
is that it would be paid to many adults of varying degrees of moral ineligibility: 
the professional criminals while out of gaol, the tramps, wastrels and spongers, 
the feckless members of respectable families, who delay settling down to an 
occupation, have no just claim on public funds.
108
 
   
Even potential allies disappointed Rhys-Williams: for instance, Geoffrey Crowther backed 
the principle of reform but refused to commit himself on details.
109
 The British Bankers’ 
Association provided only lukewarm commendation, and the National Council of Women 
concentrated on pressing for the disaggregation of married couples’ incomes.110 
The Royal Commission’s rejection of radical reform was sealed by the results of a 
specially-commissioned investigation into the disincentive effects of PAYE which was 
carried out by the Government Social Survey in February and March 1952. The survey found 
that most workers had a hazy understanding of how income tax worked and concluded that its 
impact on productive effort had been greatly exaggerated.
111
 If this was true, then the case for 
a flat tax on wages largely collapsed – as the chairman, Lord Radcliffe, recognized.112 The 
Commission’s second report in April 1954 thus dismissed proposals for integration and 
reaffirmed the conception of progressive income tax which had developed over the previous 
half-century, recommending only modest changes to remove subsistence earnings from tax 
and improve child allowances for higher earners.
113
 Such an apparently authoritative verdict 
pushed tax-benefit reform to the margins of social policy debate in Britain for almost a 
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decade. Rhys-Williams remained friendly with Macmillan and pressed her scheme on him 
again after he became Chancellor, but officials parried the proposals with ease, and the 
ambitious ‘replanning of the welfare state’ which took place under Macmillan’s government 
focussed instead on health, education, and pensions.
114
 Even Rhys-Williams turned her 
energies elsewhere in the years before her 1964 death, during which she chaired the National 
Birthday Trust, the United Europe Movement, and the Cwmbran Development Corporation.  
It was the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ in the early and mid-1960s that put tax-benefit 
integration back on the policy agenda. The failure of successive governments to raise 
National Insurance pensions to subsistence level left a growing number of pensioners reliant 
on means-tested National Assistance, which many were reluctant to claim, and Brian Abel-
Smith and Peter Townsend’s 1965 study of The Poor and the Poorest showed that relative 
poverty was also a serious problem among low-paid workers with children – a finding which 
prompted the formation of the Child Poverty Action Group.
115
 Some politicians and 
academics – including James Meade and Rhys-Williams’ son Brandon – took the opportunity 
to rally support for basic income, while the Heath government published plans to replace tax 
allowances with a tax credit scheme, devised (ironically enough) by Arthur Cockfield.
116
 The 
1974-9 Labour government abandoned Cockfield’s scheme, which it regarded as expensive 
and unwieldy, though it did follow through on a commitment to introduce a generous and 
universal child benefit.
117
  
Notwithstanding the ‘rediscovery of poverty’, however, the financial and attitudinal 
obstacles to a basic income remained very real. Political interest thus came to focus on more 
selective forms of integration. As the Manchester Guardian pointed out as early as 1957, a 
negative income tax or income guarantee would be much cheaper than Rhys-Williams’ 
scheme, since payments would be withdrawn as income rose.
118
 Milton Friedman advocated a 
negative income tax as a replacement for other forms of social provision in Capitalism and 
Freedom (1962), and the idea was quickly taken up by British neoliberals and Conservatives, 
along with some Labour politicians who saw it as a way of destigmatizing means-tested 
benefits.
119
 Enoch Powell and Douglas Houghton both developed abortive plans for an 
income guarantee for pensioners, and the Heath government introduced a means-tested 
Family Income Supplement which subsequently mutated into New Labour’s tax credits 
system.
120
 Income support for working-age claimants is now being rationalized by Iain 
Duncan Smith’s Universal Credit scheme, which will sit alongside a more universalist single-
tier state pension.
121
  
The growing influence of the ‘social market’ perspective in British social policy since 
the 1960s thus represents only a qualified triumph for Rhys-Williams’ thinking. The inter-
related character of taxation and social security is now widely recognized, and successive 
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governments have sought to refine the relationship between the two systems. Income support 
has also been extended to those in work as well as out of it. On the other hand, the prevailing 
philosophy of welfare provision has come to be dominated even more strongly by need rather 
than citizenship. As a result, basic income advocates still find themselves on the margins of a 
policy agenda geared towards poverty alleviation and work incentives.  
     
Conclusion   
  
What, then, should we make of Juliet Rhys-Williams’ campaign? Though it represented a 
path not taken, it certainly deserves more than a footnote in history. Rhys-Williams’ 
proposals offer a striking demonstration of the reach of egalitarian, universalist, and social 
contract ideas in 1940s Britain, and of the availability of radical alternatives to the Beveridge 
scheme. Two decades before the ‘rediscovery of poverty’, Rhys-Williams identified some of 
the main limitations of the social insurance model and sought to devise a remedy. She also 
used her personal and political contacts to attract support from politicians and economists and 
forced reluctant civil servants to examine the feasibility of a basic income. If her campaign 
had been successful, the post-war welfare settlement might have taken on a very different 
cast, with a less steeply graduated tax structure but a more comprehensive income floor for 
the population at large. 
In contrast to other policy entrepreneurs such as Beveridge and Eleanor Rathbone, 
however, Rhys-Williams was unable to persuade the politicians that mattered to take up her 
proposals. This failure can be attributed to a mixture of context, tactics, and strategy. Most 
important was the popularity of the Beveridge report and the power of the assumptions on 
which it was based. As is now well known, Beveridge’s determination to conquer the ‘five 
giants’ of want, idleness, ignorance, disease, and squalor was counterbalanced by a more 
traditional concern to contain the cost of welfare and preserve the liberal ethos of 
independence and responsibility.
122
 His preference for contributory insurance and his 
determination to restrict payments to cases of entitlement or destitution – except in the special 
case of family allowances – were shared by Whitehall officials, businessmen, and trade union 
leaders. Support for progressive income tax as a means of achieving equity between citizens 
was almost as widespread.
123
 Though post-war concerns about PAYE opened up the 
possibility that the welfare settlement could be recast on different lines, both Labour and 
Conservative politicians ultimately deemed it more prudent to pursue their objectives within 
the Beveridge model. If there was no consensus about the ultimate purpose of the welfare 
state in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the evidence submitted to the Royal Commission 
revealed a substantial measure of agreement on its fiscal architecture, which was reinforced 
by political caution, path-dependency, and institutional inertia.
124
 
In these circumstances, rallying support for alternative visions of welfare was a 
formidable task. Rhys-Williams achieved what she did not only because of her social contacts 
but also because she was an indefatigable campaigner, who adapted her scheme repeatedly to 
take account of criticisms and exploit new openings. Yet this flexibility was ultimately a 
weakness as well as a strength, since she sometimes seemed to be more attached to the 
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mechanics of reform than to its original purpose. Her tendency to treat expressions of interest 
as firm endorsements was damaging, and the sweeping claims which she made for her 
proposals also invited suspicion: as Hugh Gaitskell pointed out, the notion that almost 
everyone would benefit seemed ‘naïve’ and incredible.125 In an era of professionalization and 
the ‘triumph of the expert’, Rhys-Williams made it all too easy for policy-makers to dismiss 
her as a crank, pushing pet ideas onto the policy agenda through her social and political 
connections.
126
 
These tactical mistakes were compounded by the strategic problem of Rhys-Williams’ 
political conservatism. The most obvious strategy for achieving a substantial basic income in 
post-war Britain would have been to enlist support from the Labour movement, and 
especially from welfare experts such as Barbara Wootton and Richard Titmuss who were 
sympathetic to universalist ideas. Rhys-Williams might well have forged an alliance with this 
group by presenting her scheme as an embodiment of T. H. Marshall’s theory of social 
citizenship, but her strongly felt hostility to socialism made this impossible. Her own 
approach implied a very different distributive coalition, uniting Conservatives, Liberals, 
women voters, and the low paid against the unionized male breadwinner, which was always 
an unlikely prospect. In the absence of an ethical or philosophical justification for 
universalism, centre-right interest in the scheme tended to be shallow and contingent on its 
electoral potential or its value as a tax reform. When the Conservative leadership turned it 
down on both these counts, Rhys-Williams’ strategy disintegrated. 
In a longer perspective, however, a more positive assessment is possible. Through her 
influence on figures such as James Meade and Alan Peacock, Rhys-Williams helped establish 
a broader current of interest in tax-benefit integration which has become central to British 
social policy in the post-war period. Indeed, the ideological eclecticism of the ‘social market’ 
perspective has enabled it to take root across the political spectrum: basic income on the post-
materialist left, negative income tax on the free-market right, and tax credits and other hybrid 
schemes in the pragmatic centre.
127
 This shift towards a mixture of income- and age-
contingent transfer payments represents a significant departure from the contributory 
insurance model envisaged by Beveridge. At the time of writing, the political forces making 
for a selective and residual welfare system are strong, especially in respect of working-age 
claimants.
128
 The ultimate character of the twenty-first-century welfare state nevertheless 
remains an open question.  
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